Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 7 | Issue 1

Article 3

Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to
Universal Health Insurance in the U.S.
Carol S. Weissert

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Health Law Commons, and the Health Services Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Carol S. Weissert, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to Universal Health Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 42 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol7/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Health
Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

PROMISE AND PERILS OF STATE-BASED ROAD TO
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE U.S.

CAROL S. WEISSERT

1.INTRODUCTION

The states' legacy in provision of health care services is strong. States are
responsible for the funding and coordination of public health functions, the
financing and delivery of personal health services (including Medicaid, mental
health, public hospitals, and health departments), environmental protection, the
regulation of medical care providers and the technology that they employ, the
regulation of the sale of health insurance, rate setting, licensing, and cost control.
In addition, states provide health insurance for their own employees and retirees
and play a pivotal role in educating and credentialing health care professionals.1
Similarly, states are the primary innovators in health policy, serving as what
Justice Brandeis is credited as dubbing, "laboratories of democracy. ' 2 This role
goes back a long way in American history. The 1921 Sheppard-Towner Act,
which provided social and medical assistance to pregnant women and babies, was
copied from a Connecticut law. States also provided models for the 1935 Social
Security Act, the 1973 Supplemental Security Income program, and other health
measures. More recently, Medicare's Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) payment
system was based on a program in New Jersey, and the 1997 State Children's
Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP) was based on programs in Washington and
New York.
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1. See CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF
HEALTH POLICY 196-97 (2d ed. 2002).

2. While the term "laboratories of democracy" is attributed to Justice Louis Brandeis, the words
do not appear directly in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
Rather, he says, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." Id.
3. See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supranote 1,at 226.
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Following the failure of comprehensive federal health reform, states have
continued to be innovative.4 For example, between 1997 and 1999, thirty-five
states enacted new restrictions on managed care organizations, usually under the
guise of a patients' bill of rights. 5 States also launched innovative programs to
provide coverage for the working poor, to reform small-group health insurance,
and establish risk pools for those who found insurance difficult to obtain. 6 Other
programs were developed to mandate community rating, to create new ways of
delivering services to Medicaid recipients and state employees, and to hold down
the costs of prescription drugs, especially for the elderly. 7
In spite of these efforts, and an ebullient economy, the number of uninsured
has risen and the costs of health care have continued to escalate. Between 1990
and 2000, total health spending in the United States grew, on average, 3.2 percent,
while the GDP per capita grew only by an average of 2.3 percent annually. 8 Over
9
that same decade, the number of uninsured rose from 34.7 million to 38.7 million.
While the State Children's Health Insurance Program,' 0 passed in 1997, provided
help in covering children and young adults, the overall problem of the uninsured is
persistent and pervasive. What can be done, and more specifically, what can states
do to solve the problems of the uninsured?
Part II of this article examines the role federalism plays in defining health
care policy in the United States, including policy to ensure universal access to
health care. Part III explores the reasons states might be the likely initiators of
comprehensive public policy reform for the uninsured, and Part IV outlines the
constraints on state leadership in this area. Part V posits what a state-based
universal health insurance system might look like. Part VI analyzes the likelihood
of state action based on the gubernatorial elections of 2002 and state of the state
addresses in 2003. Finally, Part VII reflects upon the trends that emerge from this
analysis.

4. For more information on the politics of the Clinton Health Plan, see Scott D. Litman, Health
Care Reform for the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a Federaland State Partnership,7 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871 (1998).
5. Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of
Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 184 (2002).
6. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1,at 228-29.
7. Id.
8. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices Stupid Why the United States is So Different from
Other Countries,22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 91 exhibit I (May / June 2003).
9. See ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, PUB. NO. P60215, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000 13 tbl.A-I, available at http://www.census.gov/prod
/2001pubs/p60-215.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
10. Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 4901,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1397aa- 1397jj (West 2003).
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FEDERALISM THEORY

To understand states and health policy, one must understand the pivotal role
states play in federalism and intergovernmental relations. Federalism can be
defined as "a system of rules for the division of public policy responsibilities
among a number of autonomous government [entities]."'' In the United States,
these entities are the federal and state governments. The autonomous nature of the
relationship between these entities is key. States are not simply administrative
units of Washington; rather, they have their own responsibilities and duties, many
of them overlapping with federal responsibilities.
Federalism was a major component of the 1789 U.S. Constitution and a
pivotal element in providing a system of checks and balances to prevent the federal
government from becoming a dominant and overweening political institution.
Over the centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court has played a significant role in
defining the roles of the federal and state governments. In recent years, some
argue that the Court has emphasized state autonomy, even expanding state
sovereignty at the expense of the federal government's policymaking and
enforcement authority. 12 This has resulted in altering the balance of power
between the federal government and the states, particularly by raising the level of
state sovereign immunity to new heights.13
Clearly checks on state actions remain, including those relating to health
policy. For example, until recently the courts had curtailed state regulation of
health insurance provided by large companies that self-insure.' 4 Currently, state
law cannot require these employers to cover certain procedures, insure high-risk
groups, or make health coverage available to workers. 15 However, the courts have
been more lenient in recent years in allowing states to legislate and regulate in
these areas. 16

Politics play an important role in federalism. The U.S. Supreme Court in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority17 suggested that states were
adequately represented through the normal political process via their

11. THOMAS ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM & PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1989).

12. Susan Gluck Mezey, The US. Supreme Court's Federalism Jurisprudence:Alden v. Maine
and the Enhancement of State Sovereignty, 30 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 21, 21-39 (2000).
13. Id.
14. See Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that a state law
which mandated that health insurance plans include mental health care coverage was a legitimate state
regulation as applied to traditional health insurance products, but that it was pre-empted by ERISA
when applied to self-funded health insurance plans).
15. See, e.g., Id.; Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (holding that mixed eligibility
decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA).
16. See Heather E. Rochet, Note, Trilogy of Cases Narrow Scope of ERISA Preemption: Survival
of State Law Claims Regarding Negligent Quality of Care Under ERISA Plans in Light of Travelers,
Dukes, and Herdrich, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 827, 844-47 (2002).
17. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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representatives in Congress, and thus, absent highly unusual circumstances, it is
unnecessary for the Court to intervene to protect their interests., s More recently,
some members of the Court opined that it is the Court's duty to guard against
9
federal encroachment on the states' policymaking authority.'
Political scientists also recognize the importance of politics in U.S.
federalism. This is particularly evident in Paul Peterson's legislative theory of
federalism. Peterson argues that the modem federal system is shaped by the
political needs of legislators at various governmental levels who mostly distribute
benefits in a self-beneficial manner, by claiming credit for those benefits. 20 A
second possible model of federalism is what Peterson calls "functional federalism,"
which predicts that all governmental levels will have their own areas of functional
competence. 21 The governments' various activities will then fall into those areas
of functional competence. One such area of functional competence includes
programs designed to redistribute societal resources from the "haves" to the "havenots" by transferring economic resources from the wealthy to the needy.22 Welfare
programs are classic redistributive programs, but many feel that health programs
are redistributive as well. Alice Rivlin, for example, argues that reform of health
financing and control over medical costs will likely not be attained by the states on
their own. 23 She believes that the federal government should take firm control
over medical costs and provide universal health coverage.24 Federal action can
control medical costs by increasing supply, cost-sharing with patients, changing
incentives for providers, changing fee systems, setting targets for total health
expenditures, or providing a single-payer system where states, or groups of states,
could designate financial agents for health care. 25 Rivlin argues that only the
federal government can provide access to health care for all citizens through
universal health insurance.
Rivlin's prescription was written before President Bill Clinton's health care
plan was launched-a plan which would have dealt with these issues and more.
However, the Clinton proposal was simply not politically tenable. It was defeated

18. Id. at 556; Mezey, supra note 12, at 27; Geoffrey Moulton, The Quixotic Search for a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism,83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 851 (1999).

19. See Mezey, supra note 12, at 27 (noting Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
20. PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 39-40 (1995).

21. Id. at 16-18 (explaining that the two main purposes of government are developmental and
redistributive programs, and that the federal government should assume the primary responsibility for
redistribution, while the state and local levels of government assume primary responsibility for
development, and further providing examples of developmental and redistributive programs).
22. Id. at 17.
23. ALICE M.

RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES & THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 153 (1992).
24. Id. at 117.

25. Id. at 159-63.
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not for one reason, but for many. These included: budgetary constraints; an
antigovernment mood; the White House's inability to define the issue, frame the
debate, or sustain the effort; the plan's complexity, liberal approach and cost; the
inability of experts to agree on the reform; the lack of support from the business
community; a deeply divided public; and finally, low levels of support from the
elites.26

III.

THE PROMISE OF STATE HEALTH POLICY FOR THE UNINSURED

There are a variety of reasons why states are the likely initiators of
comprehensive public policy for the uninsured: A) states have the administrative
and policy capacity to take leadership in this area; B) states have a record as
innovators; C) states have the mechanism of direct democracy; D) preferences lie
with the states; and, E) states can serve as the default for creating health policy
when Washington fails.

A. States Have the Administrative and Policy Capacity
The term most often used to describe the administrative and policy systems in
the states is "resurgence. '" 27 David Hedge argues that there is considerable
consensus among scholars and practitioners alike that states have undergone a
"dramatic" resurgence in recent decades.28 Hedge also argues that states are more
responsive, better able, and more willing to govern now than at any other time in
history. 29 Furthermore, Hedge argues that citizen participation has increased and
states are more successful in achieving diversity than Washington, because there is
a higher level of inter-party competition and a growing diversity of interest groups
representing public opinion.3 ° In addition, governors are more powerful; state
legislatures are more professional, better staffed, and more assertive; and state
courts are more willing to intervene in the decisions and actions of both the
that "[most]
legislative and executive branches. 31 Finally, Hedge argues,
the lead in addressing a wide range of policy
importantly, the states have taken
32
problems," including health care.

26. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1,at 107-08.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See DAVID M. HEDGE, GOVERNANCE AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN STATES 3 (1998).

Id.
Id.
See id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
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B. States Have a Record as Innovators
In recent years, states have launched innovative programs to improve
health care delivery. These programs have attempted to "provide coverage for the
working poor, to reform small group health insurance, and establish risk pools for
those who find insurance difficult to obtain, to mandate community rating, to
develop new ways of delivering services to Medicaid recipients and state
employees," among other issues. 33 Sometimes actions are taken quickly, such as
Michigan's move to statewide Medicaid Managed Care following the governor's
order to "Fire, Ready, Aim." 34 Sometimes they come about more slowly, often in
response to external factors.35 In either case, the "risk" to the state is considerably
lower than it would be under federal action due to the smaller size and scope of the
program for even the largest states. It is also relatively easy for states to "pull
back" from their own bad decisions quietly, and with less displacement, than from
federal decisions.
For example, several states, including Massachusetts,
Minnesota, and Vermont, acted prior to the expected adoption of the Clinton
Health Care Plan and were forced later to retract or modify their efforts at setting
up a "managed competition" system, employer mandates, or universal access.36
Ironically, perhaps, a program that is often politically unpopular in states
is, nevertheless, often a source of innovation. In fact, Rachel Block argues that in
terms of innovation, Medicaid has a better track record than Medicare, its more
widely popular sister program. 37
Diffusion of innovation is also important. Political scientists have long
charted the mechanisms by which ideas in one state crop up in other states, often

33. See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1, at 227-29.
34. See Carol S. Weissert & Malcom L. Goggin, Nonincremental Policy Change: Lessons from
Michigan's Medicaid Managed Care Initiative,62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 206, 207 (2002).
35. See Thomas R. Oliver, The Collision of Economics and Politics in Medicaid Managed Care:
Reflections on the Course ofReform in Maryland,76 MILBANK Q. 59, 60 (1998). The author noted that
in Maryland, external events such as political turnover, especially at the office of the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, combined to trigger three major initiatives in five years. Id
at 91-92. He concluded that "[o]ne of the most notable characteristics of the [problem solving] process
is that the factors that create opportunities for significant policy change often have little or nothing to do
with the substantive problems that concern most policy experts." Id. at 91.
36. See Michael S. Dukakis, The Governors and Health Policymaking, in THE NEW POLITICS OF
STATE HEALTH POLICY 71 (Robert B. Hackey & David A. Rochefort eds., 2001); Howard M. Leichter,
Health Care Reform in Minnesota: A Journey, Not a Destination, in HEALTH POLICY REFORM IN
AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM THE STATES 217 (Howard. M. Leichter ed., 2d ed. 1997); Howard M.
Leichter, The Little State that Could-Couldn 't: Vermont Stumbles on the Road to Reform, in HEALTH
POLICY REFORM IN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM THE STATES 189 (Howard. M. Leichter ed., 2d ed.
1997.)
37. Rachel Block, Navigating Health CareReform: Why States Should Be Captains of the Ship, in
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: WHAT SHOULD THE STATE ROLE BE? 41, 43 (Forrest P. Chisman et al.
eds., 1994).
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improved, and with that state's preferences and culture in mind.38 Craig Volden
finds that states with similar policy goals, similar demographic characteristics, and
similar budgetary constraints are more likely to emulate each other.39
Significantly, he also finds that states are imitating the policies that are found to be
40
the most effective in meeting program goals.

C. States have the Mechanism of Direct Democracy
Ideally, health care reform should reflect a broad-based consensus where
citizens are actively engaged in the decision-making process. 41 In twenty-four
states, citizens do so through an initiative process that offers voters the ability to
propose legislation or constitutional amendments.42 Nearly half of the states offer
citizens the popular voter referendum where citizens can vote to accept or reject
legislation already passed.43 The initiative and the referendum processes allow
citizens a direct mechanism to enact or reject state laws and constitutional
provisions that is not available at the federal level. A number of health initiatives
have passed that would likely not have been adopted through the normal legislative
channels. For example, between 1996 and 2002, seventeen state-level initiatives
passed easing drug laws.44 Key among these were medical marijuana laws which
have been adopted in ten states.4a In addition, Oregon's assisted suicide law, the
only one in the country, was enacted by referendum.46 Finally, in November 2002,

38. See Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations:
An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 395-96 (1990) ("Regional diffusion models
emphasize the influence of nearby states, assuming that states emulate their neighbors when confronted
with policy problems.... It is unrealistic to assume that a state blindly emulates its neighbors' policies
without its public officials being influenced by the political and economic environment of their own
state."); Michael Mintrom, The State-Local Nexus in Policy Innovation Diffusion: The Case of School
Choice, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 41 (Summer 1997).
39. Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Experimenting with the Children's Health
Insurance Program 13-16 (April 2003), available at http://polmeth.wustl..edu/papers/03/voldeO3.pdf
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Twentieth Annual Summer
Meeting in Political Methodology).
40. Id at 16.
41. Howard M. Leichter, State Governments and Their Capacity for Health Care Reform, in
HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 151, 168 (Robert F. Rich & William D.
White eds., 1996).
42. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supranote 1, at 210.
43. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1, at 210.
44. Leila Abboud, White House Leads Push to Defeat Initiativesfor Softer Drug Rules, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 4, 2002, at A4.
45. See Keith Perine, C-J-S Spending Bill Becomes Venue for Wide Range of Policy Disputes,
2003 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1906, 1907.
46. Of course, this law has led to some major federalism questions since the U.S. attomey general
issued a directive that doctors and pharmacists who knowingly dispense controlled substances to assist
patients in committing suicide violate the Controlled Substances Act. A federal district court judge
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voters in Oregon defeated a proposal to establish a state-run universal health care
47
system estimated to cost $19 billion annually.

Even if initiatives fail to collect the majority of votes, they may nevertheless
have an effect on state policy. Interest groups can send a message to legislators
that the issue is important, and even if the initiative fails, it often lands on the
legislative agenda following the election. Elisabeth Gerber found that policies in
states with initiatives more closely reflect voter preferences than policies in states
without them.48

D. PreferencesLie with the States
Americans have dual citizenship: they are citizens of the United States of
America and of their own individual states. While states generally contain a
diverse swath of people, they are, nonetheless, more homogeneous than the nation
as a whole. They can also initiate policy that deals with their citizens' demands,
which reflect the citizens' wealth, race, occupation, personal and political
philosophy, and health status. Former New Hampshire Governor John Sununu put
it this way, "In diversity lies our strength. Our country is strong and prosperous
because our state and local governments can address the particular needs of their
people and areas by means that are perhaps uniquely appropriate to those
involved."A9 To view it from a political perspective, a uniform federal policy
would make a significant number of persons with differing tastes in different states
unhappy.5"

E. State Action Toward Health Policy Can Come by Default.
Martha Derthick described the default issue this way: "Typically, through
inaction by Congress, matters are left with the states, which have initial
jurisdiction.,, 51 Thomas Oliver agrees, noting that states become important when

struck down the directive in April 2002. See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Assisted Suicide: Court
Strikes Down Ashcroft Directive, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 459 (2002).
47. Jill Wechsler, Voters Cool to State Health Initiatives, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1,
2002.
48. ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX 126 (1999).

49. Leichter, supranote 41, at 159.
50. See Steven G. Craig, Should States Be Responsible for New Directions in Health Provision?
Lessons from Other Policy Areas, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES, 221,
246 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996).
51. Martha Derthick, American Federalism:Half-Fullor Half-Empty? 18 BROOKINGS REV. 24, 26

(Winter 2000).
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there is gridlock on key issues at the federal level. 52 Examples in health abound,
from the tobacco company settlement to prescription drugs, and from malpractice
reform to a patients' bill of rights. Most recently, in the area of global warming,
certainly an issue that crosses state lines, states have begun to take steps to reduce
America's contribution to global warming in the absence of national policy.

IV. PERILS OF STATE-LED UNIVERSAL ACCESS
Apart from the positive indicators of possible state-led universal access just
discussed, there are several major constraints that can prevent such leadership.
These include: A) the states' limited scope and resources, B) federal constraints, C)
possible federal change of heart, D) lack of concurrent voices, and E) term limits in
seventeen states.

A. States have Limited Scope and Resources
No matter how wealthy and forward-thinking a state may be, that state's
reach is limited by its border. Issues that cross the border are interstate (i.e.,
interstate commerce) and thus out of the state's reach. For example, telemedicine,
corporate ownership of hospitals, and employee insurance from companies that
have offices in several states, raise issues that cross state lines.
States are also limited in their available resources. State budgets are smaller
than the federal budget, and the range between the smallest and largest states is
enormous. California, the largest state, collects nearly $84 billion in taxes to run
state programs. 53 At the other end of the spectrum, Alaska, South Dakota, and
Wyoming each collect between $1 and $1.5 billion in state taxes.54 However, all
states have a major constraint that Washington does not; states must balance their
budgets at the end of their fiscal year. They are usually prohibited from borrowing
for non-capital expenses at the end of the year to avoid a deficit. Thus, if states
take on major new spending in a comprehensive health program, they must also
assume the responsibility for funding that program with actual tax dollars-not

52. Thomas R. Oliver, State Health Politics and Policy: Rhetoric, Reality and the Challenges
Ahead, in THE NEW POLITICS OF STATE HEALTH POLICY 273, 276 (Robert B. Hackey & David A.
Rochefort eds. 2001).

53. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov'T, CALIFORNIA FISCAL PROFILE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2002)
available at http://stateandlocalgateway.rockinst.org/fiscaltrends/stateprofiles (last visited Jan.31,
2004).
54. ROCKEFELLER
ROCKEFELLER

INST.

INST.

OF

OF Gov'T,

Gov'T,

ALASKA

FISCAL

PROFILE

FOR

FISCAL

YEAR

2000,

SOUTH

DAKOTA

FISCAL

PROFILE

FOR

FISCAL

YEAR

2000,

ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T, WYOMING FISCAL PROFILE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2002) availableat

http://stateandlocalgateway.rockinst.org/fiscalltrends/state-profiles

(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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monies borrowed or deficit-financed. When the economy is strong, this is no
problem; it becomes more difficult in economic downturns when states must
5
scramble to balance the budget.

B. Federal Constraints
One of the most restricting and long-standing federal constraints on state
efforts to provide universal access is the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), which sets administrative and substantive standards for the
operation of employee benefit plans.5 6 ERISA contains a preemption clause which
for decades was broadly interpreted by courts in a way that posed a substantial
challenge to state health reform initiatives. 57 However, beginning with New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 58
in 1995, the Supreme Court indicated a change of course in ERISA cases, finding
that ERISA did not preempt New York's hospital rate-setting provisions that
imposed a surcharge on Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 59 In 1997,
the Court solidified its reluctance to strictly apply ERISA's preemption clause in
two cases. 60 Finally, in 2003, the Court dismissed the idea that ERISA preempted
state "any willing provider" laws.61 While these cases seem to be narrowing
ERISA's preemption, ERISA continues to impede comprehensive state action,
particularly since large employers whose workers make up two-thirds
of the
62
national work force can opt out of any statewide health care scheme.

55. See Nicholas W. Jenny & Richard P. Nathan, Sizing Up the Shortfalls: The States in Straits,
GOV'T FIN. REV. 10, 12-13 (2001).
56. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
57. See Deborah S. Davidson, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care Reform and Uniform
Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A "Uniform Patient Protection Act, " 53 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L., 203, 205 (1998). See generally John W. Schuch, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Tort
Law Claims Against Managed Care Entities, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1221 (2002).
58. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
59. Id. at 649 (holding that the provisions did not relate to the employee benefit plans under the
meaning of ERISA's preemption provision and therefore, were not preempted). See also Davidson,
supra note 57, at 222.
60. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
334 (1997) (holding that California's prevailing wage law is neither "related to" nor has "connection
with" ERISA plans and is therefore not preempted by ERISA); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. &
Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814-16 (1997) (rejecting the theory that any state law that increases
the cost of providing benefits to covered employees, and thus has some effect on the administration of
ERISA plans, is pre-empted by the ERISA statute).
61. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003). Kentucky's "any willing
provider" laws prohibits a health insurer from refusing to contract with any qualified health care
provider who is willing to abide by the insurer's terms and is within the designated coverage area of the
health benefit plan. Id.at 1473-74.
62. See Litman, supra note 4, at 883.
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Congress has not revisited the issue since ERISA was enacted in 1974. While
state organizations and others have called for a change in the law, business
interests and labor have fought against change, arguing that fifty different sets of
63
state insurance regulations would be inefficient and burdensome.

C. PotentialFederalChange of Heart
One of the strengths of the American political system is its dynamic and
flexible nature. Every two years a new Congress convenes in Washington,
allowing enactments from a prior Congress to be repealed by any subsequent
Congress. While this may work well for federal responsiveness, it creates
difficulties for states, which may make decisions based on law adopted in time,
only to be changed substantially at a later time. Therefore, while making decisions
in part based on federal incentives, states must factor in the possibility that
Washington will renege on a promise by changing a law or de-funding a program.
This possibility affects the way states respond, either by enacting their own laws or
by implementing federal ones. Individual states may not implement a law in the
manner intended by Congress, if such action might prove expensive or if there is a
subsequent change in federal policy or funding. Recent research has highlighted
this response and dubbed it an "irony of delegation." 64 States can also enact laws
in expectation of federal legislation, as happened in the early 1990s when several
states thought national health care reform, especially managed competition, was
imminent and enacted state versions.65 When the national legislation was not
enacted, the state laws were amended or abolished. The expected value of possible
change, or inaction, can serve to dampen state enthusiasm and serve as a possible
barrier to state health reforms.

D. Lack of Concurrent Voices
Public policy is difficult to enact both in Washington and in state capitals for
a myriad of reasons, but key among them in health policy is a failure to have
concurrent voices. Consensus on public policy solutions to health-related issues is
hard to find. Consumer interest groups seldom agree with provider groups who

63. See Angelo A. Stio II, State Government: The Laboratoryfor National Health Care Reform,
19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 322, 373 (1994).
64. See generallyJeffrey S. Hill & Carol S. Weissert, Implementation and the Irony of Delegation:
The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, 57 J. POL. 344 (1995) (discussing the potential
problems associated with delegation of authority for low-level radioactive waste disposal from
Congress to an administrative agent).
65. See Stio, supra note 63, at 323, 347-64.
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have different interests than insurers, businesses, and unions. 6 6 Partisanship often
contributes to the lack of consensus in health issues as well. 6 7 Finally, the public
sends mixed messages on what they want, and more importantly, what they are
willing to pay for.68 One could argue that policy consensus is more likely at the
state than the federal level since the stakes are lower and interests are likely to be
more homogeneous. Indeed, this may be the reason why states have been able to
act on a myriad of issues still awaiting federal consensus-issues ranging from
malpractice reform to curbing the cost of prescription drugs. However, difficulties
in reaching consensus still plague state health policymaking.

E. Term Limits
Seventeen states, including four of the nation's largest (California, Florida,
Michigan and Ohio), have enacted legislative term limits which restrict the amount
of time state legislators can serve.69 In two of these states, California and
Michigan, legislators can now only serve three terms (six years) in the lower house
and two terms (eight years) in the upper house. 70 In these states the limits are lifetime; meaning the legislator cannot serve more than the six and eight years,
respectively, in his or her lifetime. 71 While the turnover in state legislatures
engendered by these provisions might auger for more change as new members
come in with new ideas, there is also the argument, supported with some initial
research, that new members are more interested in short-term solutions that can be
felt quickly in a way that can positively affect a new legislator's career. 72 Longterm solutions, those with impacts that might be realized after the legislator has left
the chamber, are less appealing. 73 Not only are long-term solutions not politically
advantageous, but they are also more difficult to enact, given the lack of concurrent
voices. 74 Finally, long-term solutions are often more complex, requiring
considerable background and expertise to understand the various nuances of both
need and potential impact.75

66.
67.
68.
69.

See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY AND CITATIONS OF STATE
TERM LIMIT LAWS, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/citations.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2004).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See CAREY ET AL., TERM LIMITS INTHE STATE LEGISLATURES 20, 21, 28 (2000).
73. See id. at 41-64.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 45-46.
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STATE-BASED UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE

If states were able to enact universal state-based health insurance, what would
it look like? The state-based road would likely have five elements. It would
involve incremental changes, often through the addition of new age groups and/or
diseases. It would involve multi-state cooperation, and possible interstate
compacts. It would include local and community involvement and participation. It
would reflect citizens' preferences, not necessarily national preferences, and it
would result in inequities.

A. Incremental Change
Public policy making is largely incremental. Incremental change is often
easier to sell to the voting public and fellow legislators because most people are
averse to risk. Policymakers are "reluctant to make large and risky changes
because the consequences and costs are hard to predict and unintended
consequences can be costly." 76 Incremental changes also build on past programs
that have a constituency more willing to readily accept growth than major program
revision.77
Incremental changes allow policymakers to learn from previous actions and
to build on the state's systems in order to carry out policy, as well as maintain
political support. Some political scientists argue that political institutions and
public policy have a status quo mentality, meaning there is a tendency for the
policy to be stable, with only incremental changes feasible. 78 However, smaller,
incremental changes can accumulate over time to produce larger, systemic
changes.79
As in Washington, incremental change toward universal health insurance
coverage in the states means adding groups of people to existing programs and
sometimes adding services to cover a specific disease. For example, the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP) was a federal-state program that
enrolled nearly four million low income children by 2002.80 Similarly, federal
incentives provided coverage for uninsured women for cervical and breast cancer

76. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra noie 1, at 256-57.
77. WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supranote 1, at 254-55.
78. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. Sc!. REV. 251, 262 (2000).
79. Leichter, supra note 41, at 153.
80. See Embry M. Howell et al., SCHIP Dodges the First Budget Ax, in ASSESSING THE NEW
FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES I (Urb. Inst., Series A, No. A-56, Wash. D.C.), Dec.
2002.
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treatment. 8 1 Also, programs targeted at the elderly and disabled are often popular
for federal and state legislators and can serve to incrementally advance coverage of
the otherwise uninsured.

B. Multi-state Cooperationand Compacts
In the past decade, the states' Attorneys General have led the way in showing
how multi-state cooperation can lead to major change in business behavior and the
environment by bringing the tobacco industry to task for costs associated with
smoking. Most notable was the "tobacco settlement between attorneys general
from 46 states, four territories, and the District of Columbia and the nation's major
tobacco companies in November 1998. "82 The deal provided states with $206
billion over twenty-five years in exchange for an agreement not to sue the tobacco
companies.8 3 The attorneys general also worked together to get the paint
manufacturers and a lead-industry group to pay states for "treating children
poisoned by lead paint and for the costs of removing lead paint from buildings. 8 4
Governors, some of them former attorneys general, have learned from these
experiences and several are attempting to forge multi-state cooperation in the area
of prescription drugs where four states from the Northeast, South, and Midwest
have formed the nation's first multi-state Medicaid Pharmaceutical Pooling
Program.85

C. More Local Involvement
Quietly and slowly, over the past decade, local and community-led efforts
have been launched across the country to deal with the issue of the uninsured.

81. Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a,
1396b, 1396d, 1396r-lb (West 2003). In addition to providing screening, the law allowed states to
expand Medicaid benefits to uninsured women who are diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer
through the federal screening program. Id.
82. Sanford F. Schram & Carol S. Weissert, The State of US. Federalism: 1998-1999, 29
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1, 16 (1999).

83. Id.
84. Carol S. Weissert & Sanford F. Schram, The State of U.S. Federalism, 1999-2000, 30
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, I, 12 (2000).

85. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Granholm Gets Results; Moves Michigan
Forward in First 100 Days (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-16823442_21974-65835-M_2003_4,00.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004). The four states are Michigan,
Vermont, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
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There are currently hundreds of community efforts underway to deal with the
problems of the uninsured.86
These efforts are sponsored by coalitions with members representing87
government, schools, hospitals, health providers, and advocacy groups.
Expanding health care coverage for the uninsured is an important goal for many of
these groups. Other goals include increasing access to services by changing
policies of providers and improving public health and prevention. 88 These
initiatives are often well organized, providing coordinated delivery of care and
oversight by a public-private collaboration.89 These efforts were recognized in the
campaigns of several gubernatorial candidates, including Jennifer Granholm, the
new Democratic governor of Michigan, who has recently sought feedback on
90
implementing such an initiative.

D. Reflect Citizens'Preferences
It is important to remember that state policies are generally non-uniform.
While states do learn from and imitate each other to some extent, ultimately their
policies reflect the desires of their own citizens. Citizen preferences differ from
state to state, and do not necessarily reflect the preferences of the nation as a
whole. Thus there is little chance that a state-based system for universal health
coverage would be uniform in nature; rather it would vary in coverage, funding,
and delivery choices.

E. Inequities
Inevitably, the result of different citizen preferences and policy choices
reflecting different citizen preferences is inequity. Citizens of one state will be
treated differently than those of another. Some political scientists have argued that
this leads to a "race to the bottom," where states will lower their benefits on

86. THE ACCESS PROJECT, ACTION WHERE IT COUNTS: COMMUNITIES RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE UNINSURED 1, 2 (June 1999), available at
www.accessproject.org/downloads/survey.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).

87. Id.
88. Id. at 3.
89. DENNIS ANDRULIS & MICHAEL GUSMANO, THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE,
COMMUNITY INITIATIVES FOR THE UNINSURED: How FAR CAN INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIPS TAKE US?

(2000), available at http://www.rwjf.org/publications/publicationsPdfs/community-init.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2004). The initiative includes efforts to reduce costs, build community relations, and make
more efficient use of services. Id.
90. See Michigan Rural Health Assoc. News, Granholm Requests Input on Future of Medicaid, at
http://www.miruralhealth.org/News/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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redistributive programs such as welfare and Medicaid so they will not become
"welfare magnets"-encouraging welfare recipients to leave a state with lesser
benefits to come to the state with more generous benefits. 9' Although there is little
evidence that welfare recipients do in fact migrate for benefits, apparently public
officials believe that they do-and act accordingly. 92 Thus, under a state-based
health insurance system, we would expect to see citizens treated differently
depending on where they live (as they do now under Medicaid, a state-defined
program, but not Medicare, a federally defined program).

V1. PROMISE CONTINUED: LESSONS FROM THE

2002

ELECTIONS

The 2002 mid-term elections were especially important for the thirty-six
states that elected governors. Governors are important bellwethers of state health
policy because they generally take the lead in comprehensive health reformespecially those reforms relating to access. The governor may be the only political
actor in the state who can build the political coalition necessary to expand access to
health care for the uninsured. The governor can garner the media attention needed
to attain public support and has resources for policy analytical work essential in
building the case for new health programs. 93 Once every four years, thirty-six
gubernatorial elections are held-including those in the eight largest states of the
country. Thus, analysis of the election rhetoric, and initial policy statements
outlined in the governors' state of the state messages, is informative of the promise
of universal health care, state style.

A. 2002 GubernatorialRaces
Access to health care was important to many gubernatorial candidates in
2002. 94 As noted in Figure 1, in nearly 60% of the states with gubernatorial

91. See generally PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A
NATIONAL STANDARD (1990).

92. Scott W. Allard, Revisiting Shapiro: Welfare Magnets and State Residency Requirements in the
1990s, 28 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 45 (1998); see also Sanford F. Schram & Joe Soss, Making
Something out ofNothing: Welfare Reform and a New Race to the Bottom, 28 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM

67, 68 (1998).
93. Dukakis, supra note 36, at 73-74.
94. In this analysis of the 36 gubernatorial races in 2002, the website for each candidate was
surveyed for health care access issues and the candidate's position on the issue. If the candidate
identified public access to health care as a major issue, then the researcher considered that to be a
success in the following statistical analysis; if there was no mention of such issues, it was considered a
failure. Candidates with no website were not counted for purposes of this analysis. Information from
each website was gathered, collected, and compiled by the author and is on file with the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy.
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elections, twenty-one states, both Republican and Democratic candidates identified
health care as a major issue in the campaign. 95 In an additional 33%, representing
twelve states, one candidate viewed access as a major issue.96 In addition, as
illustrated in Figure 2, Democratic candidates were more likely to identify access
to health care as a major issue in the 2002 campaign: 86% of the Democratic
candidates compared to only 64% of Republican candidates.97
FIGURE 1

Major Party Candidates Identifying Public
Access to Health Care as Major Issue in
2002 Gubernatorial Races
8%
El Only One Party
* Both Major Parties
E Neither Major Party

59%

FIGURE 2

% of Major Party Candidates Identifying
Public Access to Health Care as Major Issue
in 2002 Gubernatorial Races
100 80 -

60

40

86.11
63.88

-

20 0 Democrats

95. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.
96. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.
97. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.
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Candidates who viewed access to health care as a major issue seemed more
likely to win the election (although clearly other factors played a role as well).
While 76% of all candidates identified health access as a major issue in the race,
86 percent of gubernatorial winners did so. 98
FIGURE 3

2002 Gubernatorial Winners By Issue
Identification
14%

R Identified Health
Care Issues

86%

* Did Not Identify
Health Care Issues

The health policy area most often addressed in the gubernatorial campaigns
was the cost of prescription drugs. Thirteen candidates included controlling drug
costs as an element in their health platform. 99 This was, of course, often associated
with access, especially for the elderly. However, the candidates' approaches to
controlling drug costs differed. For example, the Arizona Republican candidate,
Matt Salmon, promised to work with pharmaceutical companies to provide
discount programs for seniors and to develop programs to help seniors take
advantage of these programs.100 Several gubernatorial candidates (including
Democratic candidates in Alabama and Michigan) promised to work with
neighboring states to form a regional drug purchasing pool. 10 1 Thirteen candidates

98. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy. It is important to note that
candidates without websites were not counted for purposes of this analysis.
99. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.
100. Decision 2002: Ask the Candidates, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, (Matt Salmon's responses to

Arizona Daily Star staff questions), at http://elections.azstamet.com/askcan/gov-salmon.php

(last

visited Jan. 31, 2004).
101. MIMI MARCHEV & TRISH RILEY, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ELECTION 2002:
WHAT GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES SAY ABOUT HEALTH CARE 5 (2002), available at

http://www.nashp.org/Files/summaryfor-web.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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supported a statewide model where
the state negotiates with insurers to provide the
02
best buy for drug purchasers.'
Both Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates talked of lobbying
Washington for more money. Some fourteen candidates included this strategy as
part of their health policy platform. Alabama's Democratic candidate, Don
Siegelman, called for closing federal loopholes to keep more affordable generic
drugs off the market; California's Democratic candidate, Gray Davis, called for
changes in use of S-CHIP dollars; Nevada's Republican candidate, Kenny C.
Guinn, proposed ERISA changes and more money for rural health services; and the
Democratic candidate in New York, H. Carl McCall, said he would advocate in
Washington for increased federal payment for the uninsured. 10 3 The Texas
Republican candidate, Rick Perry, promised to seek removal of federal barriers on
Medical Savings Accounts; Arizona's Democratic candidate, Janet Napolitano,
proposed going to Washington seeking increased funding for a number of health
care industry programs; and Kansas' Democratic candidate, Kathleen Sebelius, and
Maine's Republican candidate, Peter Cianchette, proposed federal increases in
Medicare reimbursement for rural hospitals. 1° 4 Other gubernatorial candidates
promised to fight in Washington for Medicare coverage of prescription drugs,
including the Democratic candidate in Pennsylvania, Ed Rendell, and Republican
0 5
candidates in Maine, Massachusetts, and Wyoming.'

102. Id at 5-6.
103. AM. ASS'N RET. PERSONS, ELECTION 2002 VOTER GUIDE: ALABAMA GOVERNOR (Candidate

responses), available at http://www.aarp.org/vg2002/a/algovernor.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
See also MIMI MARCHEV & TRISH RILEY, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, GUBERNATORIAL
ELECTIONS 2002: HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES TRACKING MATRIX 3 (2002) available at

http://www.nashp.org/Files/trackingmatrixedited-for-web2.pdf (highlighting the proposal by Gray
Davis) (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); ON THE ISSUES, KENNY GUINN ON HEALTH CARE, at
http://www.issues2002.org/Govemor/KennyGuinn_Health Care.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004);
MCCALL

GOVERNOR,

ISSUES: HEALTH

CARE,

at http://wasearch.loc.gov/e22k/20021002124829

/http://www.mccall02.com/html/issues/health.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (on file with the Journal
of Health Care Law & Policy).
104. See MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 4, 29 (highlighting the proposals by the candidates
from Arizona and Texas); Press Release, Nicole Corcoran-Basso, Sebelius Announces Plan for Health
Care and Prescription Drugs (Oct. 1I, 2002) [hereinafter Sebelius Press Release]; Press Release,
Cianchette for Governor, Cianchette Begins "Road to Growth" Tour Across Maine (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.cianchetteforgovernor.com/release9-9-02.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (on
file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
105. 2002 PA Gubernatorial Candidates: Different Prescriptions for Health Care in Pennsylvania,
HEALTH L. PA. NEWS (Newsletter of the Pennsylvania Health Law Project), Oct. 2002 at 7 [hereinafter
2002
PA
Gubernatorial
Candidates],
available
at
http://www.phlf.org/news
/healthlawpanewsoct_2002.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004); see MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note
103, at 14, 16 (highlighting the initiatives by the Maine and Massachusetts candidates); ON THE ISSUES,
JIM
GERINGER
ON
HEALTH
CARE,
at
http://www.issues2002.org/Govemor
/Jim_GeringerHealth_Care.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Health Care
Law & Policy).
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Eleven candidates proposed expanded coverage for families with children
covered under S-CHIP. 10 6 Fifteen candidates proposed expansion of health
insurance for children, primarily through raising the eligibility ceiling for SCHIP.10 7 The elderly were also a target for candidates, with eleven candidates
proposing programs for education on drug management, alternatives to long-term
care, and targeted tax cuts.' 0 8 In addition, several governors also proposed
expanding Medicaid coverage to the disabled.' 0 9
Several gubernatorial candidates, primarily but not exclusively Republican,
called for relief for insurance companies or providers as a way of improving
access. The most common proposal along this line, shared by thirteen candidates,
was a call for pooling the insurance costs of employers." 0 Some candidates
(including the Democratic candidates in Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas, and
Republican candidates in Arizona and Hawaii) proposed tax incentives for
employers providing employees with a basic core of health care coverage."'
Two Democratic candidates (Michigan and Pennsylvania) were interested in
expanding the number of Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) in their
state."l 2 This proposal serves to improve access-and leverage federal dollars.
Efforts to persuade health providers to serve in rural areas and to encourage
more young people to go into nursing were evidenced in thirteen states. The
Massachusetts Democratic candidate, Shannon P. O'Brien, supported expansion in
the supply of community health workers throughout the state."l 3 Pennsylvania's
Democratic candidate, Ed Rendell, called for establishment of a state center for
14
health care careers."

106. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 101, at 1, 5.
107. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103. The candidates were: Diegelman (D-AL), Napalitano (D-

AZ), Davis (D-CA), Heath (D-CO), Bush (R-FL), Brady (D-ID), Blagojevich (D-IL), Sebelius (D-KS),
Townsend (D-MD), Granholm (D-MI), Femald (D-NH), Richardson (D-NM), McCall (D-NY), Rendell
(D-PA), and Frreundenthal (D-WY).
108. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103. The candidates were: Salmon (R-AZ), Bush (R-FL),
Hirono (D-HI), Gross (R-IA), Sebelius (D-KS), O'Brien (D-MS), Moe (D-MN), Penny (I-MN), Taft
(R-OH), Fisher (R-PA), and Carcieri (R-RI).
109. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103. The candidates making these proposals included:
Napaloitano (D-AZ), Mahoney (I-IN), Blagojevich (D-IL), Moe (D-MN), Richardson (D-NM), and
Pataki (R-NY).
110. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 101, at 6.
111. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 4, 5, 8, 11 (highlighting proposals by candidates in

Arizona, Colorado, and Hawaii); Sebelius Press Release, supra note 104 (discussing proposal by the
democratic candidate from Kansas).
112. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 17, 25.
113. MASS. HoSP. ASS'N, CANDIDATES SPEAK OUT: HOSPITALS & HEALTH CARE ESSENTIAL TO
OUR QUALITY OF LIFE 8 (2d ed. 2002).
114. THE ARC OF PENNSYLVANIA, QUESTIONS TO 2002 GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES 3, available

at http://www.thearcpa.org/gubernatorial2002.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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While most of the proposals and issues diffused across state lines and have
been adopted elsewhere, there were some novel proposals. Particularly noteworthy
were proposals on health-related information. For example, Arkansas' Democratic
candidate, Jimmie Lou Fisher, called for public disclosure of drug industry
marketing and promotional spending.11 5 Wisconsin's Democratic candidate, Jim
Doyle, called for the development of a written report from each insurance company
and HMO with the number and percentage of employers whose premiums it has
increased by more than 10, 15, and 20 %.116 He then proposed that these results be
posted online so employers would know which HMOs and insurers "to avoid."" 7
The Republican candidate in Texas, Rick Perry, called for the state to publish a
small employer rate guide and provide assistance to help small employers find
11 8
information and understand their options.
Two other innovative proposals dealt with health professionals and
community initiatives. Colorado's Republican candidate, Bill Owens, proposed
working to make health insurers offer plans that cross state lines, as well as
enabling nurses who live in nearby states to work in Colorado. 119 Ohio's
Democratic candidate, Tim Hagan, proposed a Community Access Program to
provide modest but catalytic grants to local communities to undertake creative
public-private partnerships with medical institutions targeted toward reducing
120
racial disparities in health care outcomes.
A few of the candidates promised to expand access for the working poor
including the New Hampshire Democratic candidate, Mark Fernald, who pledged
to work to create a "Healthy Adults" program to cover the working poor and to
create a health insurance program for the uninsured by using the state's tobacco
settlement money.1 21 New Mexico's Democratic candidate, Bill Richardson, called
for building upon SCHIP to create a Medicaid safety net for the elderly and
2
disabled.

2

115. Michael R. Wickline, Governor Touts Rx Discount Fisher Denounces Move as Political,ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 2002, at B 1, availableat 2002 WL 100116206.
116. DOYLE-FOR-GOVERNOR, THE DOYLE HEALTH CARE PLAN, "A

HEALTHIER WISCONSIN",

availableat http://www.doyle2002.com/issues/health.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
117. Id.
118. GOVERNOR RICK PERRY'S PROPOSALS FOR BUILDING A HEALTHY TEXAS (2002), availableat

http://www.rickperry.org/PerryOnlnsurance.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
119. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 8.

120. Press Release, Tim Hagen, Policy Statement (copy of original web language on file with the
Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
121. NEW HAMPSHIRE FOR HEALTH CARE, TAKE ACTION!

WHERE THE CANDIDATES STAND

(response of Mark Fernald) (copy of original web language on file with the Journal of Health Care Law
& Policy).
122. Medicaid Today: The States' Perspective Before the Subcommittee on Health, House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 108'h Cong. (2003) (Prepared testimony of Gov. Bill Richardson), available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03122003hearing815/Richardson 1334.htm
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2004).
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Other platform issues included malpractice (from the Nevada and the
Massachusetts Republican candidates);' 23 report cards and improved health
program dissemination (Democratic candidates in Arizona, Connecticut, and New
Mexico); 124 mental health parity (Democratic candidates in New York and
Ohio); 125 anti-smoking (Democratic candidate in New York );126 and MSAs
(Republican candidates in Arizona and Minnesota ).127In several areas, the
candidates provided more rhetoric than actual policy solutions. Areas particularly
prone to rhetoric without substance were racial inequities (Democratic candidate in
Massachusetts), healthy behavior (Democratic candidate in Ohio), public health
(Democratic candidates in Wisconsin and Maine), and rural health (Democratic
candidates in Arizona and Texas).
While there were some policy areas in which the party candidates clearly
differed, far more common was endorsement by both the Democratic and
Republican candidates. For example, both the Democratic candidate in Michigan,
Jennifer Granholm, and the Republican candidate in Texas, Rick Perry, supported
federally qualified health centers, and both the Democratic candidate in Texas,
Tony Sanchez, and the Republican candidate in Wisconsin, Scott McCallum,
28
called for incentives for health professionals.1
In addition, there were Democratic candidates who called for reducing the
health care bureaucracy by streamlining paperwork (Connecticut) and for "market129
based" solutions to the problem of escalating prescription drug prices (Ohio).
Tax credits were proposed by Democratic Candidates in Iowa (Tom Vilsack) and
Colorado (Rollie Heath), and both Maine's Republican candidate (Peter
Cianchette) and Michigan's Democratic candidate (Jennifer Granhoim) called for
30
more public-private partnerships in solving health care problems. 1
Overall, what is striking about these proposals is: 1) the importance that
access played in the campaigns of most gubernatorial candidates, 2) the common
concern for the elderly (particularly prescription drugs) and rising costs, 3) the bi-

123. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 16, 19.
124. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 4, 8, 21.

125. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 22.
126. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 22.
127. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 5, 18.

128. MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 17, 29, 31 (detailing proposals for candidates in
Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin, respectively).
129. BILL CURRY FOR GOVERNOR '02, QUALITY HEALTH CARE: LOWER COSTS, INCREASED

ACCESS, STRONGER PATIENTS' RIGHTS 7, (Connecticut Democratic candidate for governor) (copy of
original web language on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy); MARCHEV & RILEY,
supra note 103, at 22 (detailing Ohio Democratic candidate's proposals).
130. ON

THE

ISSUES,

TOM

VILSACK

ON

HEALTH

CARE,

available

at

http://www.ontheissues.org/GovernorfromVilsackHealth Care.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004);
MARCHEV & RILEY, supra note 103, at 8, 14, 17 (detailing candidates plans in Colorado, Maine, and
Michigan, respectively).
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partisan nature of some of the proposals to deal with access (including the
proposals for regional drug purchasing efforts, lobbying Congress, and expansion
of health insurance for children), 4) the incremental nature of the proposals, 5) the
increased concern over interstate cooperation (especially in the drug purchase
arena), and 6) the paucity of "crisis" language.

B. 2003 State of the State Messages
Thirty-six governors were elected in November 2002. By January, they were
preparing state of the state messages-not as candidates but as governors. What
then did they say about access to health care?' 3 '
Nearly half, 47%, of governors giving state of the state messages in 2003
mentioned access to health care in these messages. 132 Again, the concerns were
largely bipartisan. Four governors, two Democrats (Iowa and Oregon) and two
133
Republicans (Alabama and Colorado), highlighted the importance of access.
Four governors-three Republicans (South Carolina, Vermont, and Ohio) and one
Democrat (Virginia) called for changes in Medicaid; five governors (Republicans
in Alaska, Minnesota, Montana and Rhode Island, and one Democrat in Wyoming)
134
addressed the costs of medical care as an impediment to access.

131. In the author's survey of governor-elect speeches, the state was counted only if access to health
care was referred to directly.
132. Survey data on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy.
133. Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack, Condition of the State Address (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=state&sa=showStateOfStateSpeech;
Oregon Governor Ted
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Eight governors, including five Democrats and three Republicans, promised
to expand or protect S-CHIP. 3 5 Six governors called for prescription drug
programs-four Democrats and two Republicans. 36 Malpractice was covered in
the addresses of two Republicans and one Democratic governor, and the
Democratic governor of Missouri, Bob Holden, suggested increasing the state's
cigarette tax to provide health care for the uninsured. 137 Pooled insurance, which
was prominent in the campaign information, appeared only in the state of the state
message of one governor, Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle. 138 The importance 1of
39
assuring an adequate number of health providers appeared in only one message.
The new governor of North Carolina, Michael Easley, proposed a new program
targeted toward prevention of health problems, and the Democratic governor of
New Mexico, Bill Richardson, proposed a new plan to reshape the health care
140
industry in his state to improve access.

C. FiscalDifficulties
As the new governors assumed office, the fiscal difficulties mounted. The
decrease in state tax revenues in 2002 was more than twice as steep as declines in
previous years when states experienced significant fiscal difficulties (1980-82 and
1990-91). 14 ' New spending became increasingly problematic; legislatures and
governors began looking at simply maintaining current programs including those
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providing health insurance for the working poor and children. As the fiscal
situation worsened, not only were new programs put on hold in the first quarter of
2003, but "almost every state [had] made or [was] planning to make cuts in
Medicaid benefits, eligibility, or payments to health care providers.' 42
Indeed, during Fiscal Year 2003, all 50 states and the District of Columbia
implemented Medicaid cost containment measures and planned to do more in
Fiscal Year 2004.143 Between January 2002 and April 2003, five states made
major cuts in eligibility for low-income parents, four states lessened the coverage
for children, and five states reinstated "at least one procedural barrier that could
compromise enrollment or renewal in their health care programs."1 44

VII. TRENDS IN2002-2003
Three trends emerged from a systematic analysis of gubernatorial candidates'
health proposals as portrayed on their campaign websites and state of the state
messages: 1) they were a reflection of the public's desire to be lightly governed; 2)
decentralization continues to be valued; and, 3) states are important (again)
politically.
The issue of the proper governmental role in health care has been an ongoing
one for decades. But the bottom line is that Americans have never embraced the
idea of strong central governance or provision of a single-payor health care system
to the same extent as those provided in Europe and Canada. Rather, there has been
a continuing balancing act between providing services for the (truly) needy with
the American desire for a market-based health delivery system. Overall there
seems to be little interest in heavy-handed governance in health or other areas. The
gubernatorial candidates' health pronouncements reflect this preference for lightly
governed health.
Decentralization is a second long-standing value in the United States that
plays out in health policy preferences. Devolution, the shifting of authority from
the federal to state governments, has been a popular source of political rhetoric
since President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, but it has a mixed history of
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implementation. 145 The devolution or decentralization of state functions to
localities has been less popular. However, there has been a growing interest in
"bottom-up" community-based initiatives, often resulting in collaborations
between local governmental units and business. 46 In the 2003 gubernatorial races,
there was some interest in promoting local solutions to state health problems in
47
gubernatorial candidates especially in Michigan and Ohio.
Finally, it appears that the states are politically important (again). As
innovators, as implementers, and as an interest group, states are becoming more
politically active. President George Bush's 2000 candidacy got an early and
important boost from his fellow Republican governors who hoped to put one of
their own in the White House. The National Governors' Association (NGA) is a
visible and often successful lobby group in Washington. Finally, the Supreme
Court's rediscovery of state sovereignty has increased states political legitimacy
and stature. 148

VIII. CONCLUSION

Overall, states have both strengths and weaknesses as initiators of universal
health insurance. States have long been engaged as providers, shapers, and funders
149
of health programs, and have dominated health policy reform since the 1980'S.
Most obviously, state health access programs would likely not be universal. States
would adopt and adapt programs to meet the needs of their own citizens. Some
advantages could be garnered by interstate cooperation, as the movement toward
pooling pharmaceutical programs indicates. But these movements are in their
infancy and realistically cannot yet be expected to involve comprehensive
programs or policies.
A state-based comprehensive reform would involve different components
perhaps building on a framework that is similar. States do clearly learn from other
states and innovations diffuse, and change, as they cut across states. Some states
would provide more generous and accessible programs; others would not-similar
to previous experiences with Medicaid and S-CHIP. Some states can simply
afford to do more than others; some states choose not to do so.
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A more effective model of universal health insurance might feature states and
the federal government working together. After all, as Thomas Oliver reminds us,
"[the] states and the federal government share a fairly common [health] agenda,
influenced heavily by market dynamics in the health care system and by changing
perceptions of social problems, population groups and industries."' 50 A more
realistic and prevalent model involves the federal government providing the
framework and incentives for states to act, but allowing discretion to the states to
put in place a program that best fits the needs and desires of their citizenry. The
Medicaid and S-CHIP programs embody this approach although there are some
important differences.15 ' This intergovernmental mechanism-where the federal
government provides the parameters and allows states some discretion in policy
choices related to both services and beneficiaries-is one that is recommended by
legal scholars and political scientists. For example, Scott Litman and James
Holloway have argued for cooperative federalism which recognizes that the only
way to obtain congressional consensus on health policy is to allow states to
implement health care to meet their needs, subject to the general mandate of the
federal government. 152 Rather than a mandate, Eleanor Kinney argues that states
have traditionally done better in expanding coverage for the uninsured poor when
they have joined with the federal government as a partner through the Medicaid
program. 53 Both Litman and Kinney favor reforming ERISA, where states are
allowed more leeway to regulate employer-provided health insurance, and urge
154
more flexibility for states in Medicaid.
Some political scientists also propose a cooperative federalism approach to
health policy, where the federal and state governments are partners, where there is
federal funding and standards (along with enforcement, evaluation, and revisions
where appropriate), and where states can choose from a menu of policy choices
and are encouraged to develop supplemental programs as sources of innovation. 55
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An important component of cooperative federalism involves accountability,

where states are held responsible for implementing policies within the federal
parameters and goals.
Frank Thompson believes that performance-based
accountability is key to what he calls transparent federalism in the health care
arena, which can provide insights into what works and what does not and can
156
facilitate the diffusion of innovation.
Health access has been on the public agenda in the United States for decades.
There is little reason to think that will change in the first decade of the new
millenium. In 2003, there seems to be no fiscal resources, no public outcry, and no
political will for innovation to actually occur. Thus, the promise of state-based
universal health insurance seems extremely limited. On the other hand, states are
continuing to deal innovatively with immediate problems and work through
possible solutions by both approving and discarding ideas that might later prove to
be helpful in fashioning a national system. But that system, should it succeed, will
likely be an intergovernmental model rather than a top-down one, and it will be
fashioned incrementally, rather than developed all at once. This is the way health
care reform has occurred in the past, and there is little reason to expect it to change
in the future.
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